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Conclusion
The general finding to which this survey leads may be stated briefly.
Since the Civil War, there was a succession of long swings in aggregate
construction activity with a duration between fifteen and twenty-five
years. Considering the weaknesses in the records of construction activ-
ity before World War I, it cannot be said with assurance that the long
waves in aggregate construction in every case took the form of long
upswings followed by protracted declines. On two occasions—in the
nineties and in the period before World War I—it appears that the
declines were mild. The evidence for the 1870's is hard to interpret.
The available sectoral series all display large and generally consilient
declines. But these data are defective in one way or another, and their
showing is contradicted by the behavior of the Kuznets estimates of
aggregate construction, themselves faulty, which suggest no more than
a decline in the rate of advance. Conceivably, the real movements in
all three cases represent no more than retardation in growth. One can,
however, say with assurance that there was a succession of long swings
in aggregate construction activity in which very large and protracted
upsurges, lasting eight to fifteen years or more, were followed by ex-
tended periods of decline or pronounced retardation in growth, lasting
three to seven years. Further, if the long swings in aggregate construc-
tion are viewed as fluctuations in rates of growth, it can again be
said with assurance that there was a succession of such swings with a
duration between fifteen and twenty-five years and that fluctuations in
growth rates were very wide. Finally, in each of the swings, there was
an extended period in which the rate of growth became either clearly
negative or very low —solow that in view of the weaknesses of the data
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it may have been negative. In any event, for periods longer than ordi-
nary business cycles, rates of growth were below the pace which, in the
economy at large, has been required to keep the growing labor supply
fully employed and the accumulating stock of capital utilized at de-
signed levels of intensity.
The long swings in aggregate construction reflect more than the
familiar fluctuations of house-building or railroad construction. Al-
though long-swing declines were most prominent in these sectors, they
emerge with more or less regularity in the records of all the major
branches of the construction industry. The reality of these movements
is attested by comparisons of the durations and amplitudes of the puta-
live long swings with those of the shorter (specific) cycles in the same
series and still better by the marked differences in the character of spe-
cific cycles when classified by phase of long swings. With the exception
of shipbuilding (if that industry is, indeed, properly a branch of con-
struction), the long swings in all the major sectors of construction
shared in the long swings of aggregate construction. Upsurges in the
level of aggregate construction were invariably accompanied by up-
swings in all the major branches of the industry. Long-swing declines
were accompanied on each occasion by declines in most branches and
by retardations in virtually all. Viewed as fluctuations in rates of
growth, the conformity of the individual sectors to swings in aggregate
construction was well-nigh perfect. Subject to the possible exception
of nonresidential building in the period just before World War I, the
growth of all the major branches not only exhibited retardation, their
rates of growth became very low or even negative for extended inter-
vals during each of the periods identified as declines in the level of
aggregate construction activity. In sum, since the Civil War, there has
been a succession of long swings in aggregate construction activity.
These consisted of upsurges followed either by protracted declines or
pronounced retardations, in which all the major sectors of the industry
participated. The widespread participation of the major sectors is a
finding important in its own right and also as confirmation of the long-
swing behavior of aggregate construction.
Participation, needless to say, does not imply uniformity. We have
seen that individual sectors skipped one or more declines in the level
of activity in which most other sectors shared and that there was an
extra movement in a few individual series. The several sectors also
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reached peaks and troughs in somewhat different years, and a glance
at the charts will show that the amplitudes of fluctuation and the pat-
terns made by the pace of advance and decline varied from sector to
sector. With all this diversity, however, there was also an impressive
degree of similarity. Peaks and troughs tended to cluster in distinct
bands of years. All the sectors experienced long upswings during the
great surges of general construction activity; most of them shared in the
declines; and those that did not actually decline experienced retarda-
lion. Indeed, with practical unanimity, their rates of growth became
very low for extended periods.
These findings carry with them a number of implications concerning
the sorts of causal factors which an explanation of long swings in con-
struction must encompass and, indeed, concerning the nature of the
general long swings in economic growth. They can perhaps be placed
in proper perspective if, anticipating the results of other work, we note
that long swings in aggregate construction also reflect the widespread
participation of construction activity in many localities and regions, as
well as in various sectors. Nevertheless, the observation of a tendency
for many otherwise divergent spheres of construction to join in com-
mon long swings should not be taken to suggest that some set of rela-
tions peculiar to the construction industry and the real estate market
has operated to generate the observed fluctuations. It is doubtless true
that the processes of decision, planning, negotiation, and execution of
work are more time-consuming than are the same processes
in most other branches of investment and production. It is probably
also a peculiar characteristic of the construction industry that much work
is carried on by small firms who go out of business, and permit their
labor forces to become dispersed, when business slumps; so beyond
a certain point, rapid revivals of activity are retarded by the need to
rebuild capacity in the industry. The response of supply to the emer-
gence of excess demand is, therefore, especially slow in construction.
The persistence of a condition of excess demand for protracted periods
may well be a factor which attracts more capacity to the industry than
it can sustain, which feeds speculative activity, and which stimulates
the building of more housing, railroad, industrial, and commercial
capacity than the market can, for a time, absorb. Similarly, the very
durability of structures is doubtless one reason why an excess supply,
when it emerges, causes construction activity to be depressed for a long
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time.' Important as the sluggish responses of supply to excess or defi-
cient demand may be, however, they are hardly sufficient to explain
fluctuations of national scope in any single sector, still less in aggregate
construction.
The reason is that structures are not only immobile themselves, they
provide products or services which are either specialized in character
or else available only in the locality of the structures. Thus, the con-
struction of dwellings gives rise to a local supply of shelter available
to satisfy demand only in the same locality. The sluggish response of
supply to changes in demand may therefore explain long waves in
house-building in particular communities. By themselves, however, such
lagged reactions cannot explain why building cycles in individual com-
munities run together to form long waves in the national total of resi-
dential building. Similarly, the slow adaptation of the supply of struc-
tures to excess or deficient demand might explain long waves in the
plant expansion of particular industries, but would not explain such
waves in the national total of industrial building. And so also for re-
gional waves in the construction of transportation or electric power
facilities and their corresponding national totals. Finally, whatever the
basis for the nationwide waves in each sector, supply responses in the
construction industry and the real estate market (which are presumably
somewhat different in each sector) cannot account by themselves for
the formation of national waves in aggregate construction. Some causes
must be specified which can produce conditions of excessive or deficient
demand in the several sectors at about the same time.
Some of the explanation for the partial unification of local and see-
toral fluctuations in construction no doubt lies in the direct connections
among them. Street, sewage disposal, water supply, electric power, and
local distribution facilities all to some degree complement one another
and residential housing. Forces that stimulate the latter will also en-
courage the former. So, too, the construction of railroads stimulated
certain types of industrial building, and there may be other connections
of the same sort.
lArthur F. Burns has proposed a theory of long cycles in residential building
which depends in part on lagged responses in the building industry and in real
estate markets but includes other important elements. J. B. D. Derksen and others
have presented econometric studies of building based upon a system of lagged
responses. See Burns, "Long Cycles in Residential Building" (5); and Derksen,
"Long Cycles in Residential Building" (13).
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Some part of the explanation also is almost certain to be found in the
impact of wars which, by restricting construction, created great back-
logs of unfilled demand for additional structures of all kinds throughout
the country. The return of peace was then accompanied by a general
burst of construction activity. The disturbances to income and finance
associated with great depressions doubtless had the same kind of uni-
fying influence.
These explanations, however, are unlikely to be sufficient. One rea-
son is that the occurrence and progress of protracted depressions and
recoveries are not independent of the progress of activity in the con-
struction industry itself. Since income originating in construction work
constitutes a large fraction of investment expenditure and, in the past,
constituted a malor fraction, it is plausible to think that the state of
demand for new structures itself played an important part in causing
serious depressions and recoveries, or some of them. It is most unlikely
that, in this connection, streams of causation should run predominantly
in one direction.2
A more important reason, however, is that investments in structures
cannot be regarded as merely the stretched-out response of construction
activity to some initial stimulus given by excessive demand, or to some
initial curb imposed by excessive suppiy. The influences underlying the
demands for structures, the cost of building, and the supply of finance
are themselves in constant motion; and there is evidence that at least
some of these influences are national in scope and have themselves
moved in long swings. Thus the demand for residential housing is influ-
enced by the growth of population, or at least by the growth of popu-
lation in those age groups in which marriage rates and rates of house-
character of general business cycles does, indeed, seem to have been
associated with the phases of long swings in construction. If one classifies the busi-
ness cycles in the National Bureau chronology according to whether they fell in the
upswing or downswing of the general construction cycles (as marked off by the
reference dates shown in text table on p. 90, above) one finds that the durations
of business-cycle expansions occurring during construction upswings were on the
whole longer than those occurring during construction downswings and that the
opposite was true of business-cycle contractions. Further, if one takes advantage
of an index of the amplitudes of business cycles derived by Geoffrey H. Moore, one
finds that similar differences were characteristic of business-cycle amplitudes. An
analysis of variance suggests that these differences were systematic. An early ver-
sion of these calculations was reported in the 38th Annual Report of the National
Bureau of Economic Research, New York, May 1958, pp. 49-53.
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hold formation are especially high.3 Andpopulationgrowth, more espe-
cially the growth of population in the critical age groups, has moved
in long swings chiefly because, until the 1920's, it was fed by the great
swings of immigration, which were themselves dependent on the state
of the labor market.
These same demographic changes presumably impinge on construc-
tion activity generally. For the age groups in which new household
formation is especially important are also age groups that contribute
disproportionately to the growth of the labor force. Moreover, since the
growth of these age groups was alternately quickened or retarded by
waves of immigrant laborers, the impact on the size of the construction
labor force may have been extraordinarily strong. Therefore, labor-
supply movements may have played a part, now in facilitating, at other
times in hampering, the growth of construction activity generally.
So far as investment by railroads and electric power companies is
concerned, Lawrence Klein4 and others have shown that the bulk of the
fluctuations since 1920 were connected with fluctuations in the level of
profits or with an associated variable—some measure of the intensity of
use of capital. My preliminary studies suggest that this set of connec-
tions was effective for railroads at least as early as 1870 and perhaps
earlier; that movements in capital-output ratios and profits took the
form of long waves; that the swings in the utilization ratio apparently
arose from swings in the rate of growth of railroad traffic, which was
followed, only after some lag, by the addition of new railroad facilities,
while the fluctuations in the growth rate of traffic were associated with
long swings in the rate of growth of national product.
The national influences controlling the construction of industrial
facilities are less clearly visible. Current speculation is that, as in the
case of railroad and public utility investment, fluctuations in industrial
construction are controlled by the movements of output and capital
SAn important new study by Burnham Campbell establishes the importance to
residential building of shifts in the age distribution of the population and their
dependence in the past on immigration waves; "The Housing Life Cycle and Long
Swings in Residential Construction" (9). Cf. also Newman, The Building Industry
and Business Cycles (36), and Kuznets, "Long Swings in the Growth of Population
and Related Economic Variables" (28).
L"Studies in Investment Behavior" (26).
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stock, that is, by influences that determine utilization ratios, or by the
closely associated level of profits. If so, it may be possible to show that
(as in the case of railroads) there were long waves in capital-output
ratios and profits. But this also remains for future study.
Manifestly, even the general lines of an explanation of the long
swings in aggregate construction can only be dimly perceived at the
present time. One feature of such an explanation, however, seems clear
enough. The very existence of long swings in aggregate construction
means that they are part of a wider phenomenon. An explanation must,
therefore, envisage an interaction between construction activitythe
economy at large in which long swings appear in many facets of eco-
nomic and demographic change; and these feed back, each in its own
fashion, to impose something of a common pattern on the otherwise
divergent geographical and sectoral branches of construction.
The view I tentatively entertain here is that the long waves in
aggregate construction have arisen from the variant response patterns
peculiar to the several branches of construction and its many geographi-
cal subdivisions which are more or less firmly bound together, partly
by the complementary character of different sorts of structures, and
partly by influences stemming from an interaction between construc-
tion activity and the economy at large. If this view is generally correct,
it has implications for the possible recurrence of construction cycles in
the future. For there have been marked changes both in the sectoral
composition of construction and in the lines of influence which run
from construction activity to the general economy and from the econ-
omy to construction.
The major changes in the importance of the various sectors have al-
ready been noticed (Chapter 2). Construction by governments, a sector
of limited size before World War I, has come to include about a quarter
of the whole. On the other hand, railroad construction, which was al-
most a fifth of the total in earlier decades, is now of negligible impor-
tance. This means that a sector relatively independent of market forces
has taken the place of one characterized in the past by violent long
swings. On the other hand, construction by the power and communi-
cations industries, which moved in marked long swings in the past, has
become larger, while farm construction has been less important in re-
cent decades than before World War I. Nonfarm residential building
has continued to constitute about a third of the total since about the
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beginning of the century—it was still larger before—but its internal
composition has changed. Single-family units, which accounted for 60
to 70 per cent of dwelling units started until about 1930, ran between
80 and 90 per cent of the total between 1945 and On the other
hand, two-family and multifamily units are now much less important.6
Since these types of housing differ in their construction periods, in the
character of the firms which undertake them, in their financial require-
ments, and in their propensities to engender speculation, such a change
in composition presumably alters the way in which the stock of dwelling
units and the rate of building respond to conditions of excess demand
or supply.
The lines of force running between the construction industry and
the economy at large have also shifted in ways which are significant for
long swings in construction. The financing of construction activity has
changed. Amortized mortgages have replaced conventional contracts
in residential building; institutions rather than individuals have become
the chief sources of mortgage loans; the government has become im-
portant as a guarantor of home mortgages and as a lender of last resort;
and it attempts in several ways to regulate the market for real estate
finance both for houses and other kinds of structures.7 Various new
kinds of institutional financing have also become important in the mar-
ket for commercial building. It follows that the construction industry
faces different conditions for the supply of funds and that general eco-
nomic changes which affect the cost and availability of financing strike
the industry through new channels and with changed force.
Perhaps still more important are the changes in the influences which
run through demographic paths. Before the mid-1920's, when immigra-
tion was relatively free, construction activity interacted with popula-
tion growth in ways which lent added strength to fluctuations in either
one. When construction boomed, the associated rise in economic activ-
ity made the labor market tight. This, in turn, stimulated immigration.
Grebler, Blank, and Winnick, Capital Formation in Residential Real Estate
(21), Table B-2.
6However, building of multifamily units has been growing during the last few
years, while building of one-family homes has been declining.
7See ibid., Part B. See also Grebler, Housing Issues in Economic Stabilization
Policy, New York, NBER Occasional Paper 72, 1960.
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Since the immigrants were largely young adults, they raised the volume
of additions to population in just the age groups in which the demand
for additional housing is especially strong. And since they also included
large numbers of unskilled laborers who concentrated in the larger cities,
they raised the volume of additions to the labor force in general and, in
particular, the potential supply of urban and railroad construction
workers. Thus, a long-swing rise in construction activity stimulated the
demand for structures and helped to ease the supply of construction
labor. When construction activity fell off, the downswing gained force
because of the associated decline in the level of immigration.
Since the 1930's, changes in immigration have come to be a minor
portion of changes in population growth and labor force growth. Fluctu-
ations in household formation and population growth, however, were
largerthan in preceding periods.8 Their chief sources were in the native
population and in natural increase. It is plausible to think that in part
this is because the impact of the Great Depression and of recovery fell
more largely on the resident population of the country, who in former
decades, were partly protected by the response of immigration to the
state of the labor market. It remains true, however, that the mechanism
of population response to depression and recovery is now very different
than it used to be and that this must have significance for the course of
future fluctuations in construction.
Beyond these changes, which influence the response patterns of pri-
vate construction, a change must be expected in the behavior of public
construction. Much of this activity responds to imperious impulses
its own, particularly construction of defense facilities. Much of it, how-
ever, is complementary to private buildings; and there are strong pres-
sures on governments to provide the public facilities which new addi-
tions to the stock of housing and of industrial structures require. On
the other hand, there also are pressures to use public construction as
a counterweight to the movements in the private sector or, at least, to
keep the fluctuations of public construction from aggravating the move-
ments of the total. The scope for such deliberate, countercyclical man-
agement of construction in the public sphere is likely to widen.
8Cf.Kuznets,"Long Swings in the Growth of Population and Related Vari-
ables" (28), pp. 25-52; Abramovitz, Statement (1),pp. 448-451; and Campbell,
"The Housing Life Cycle and Long Swings in Residential Construction" (9).
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If the response patterns of the various branches of construction are
changing, so too is the impact of construction on the rest of the econ-
omy. The share of gross new construction in gross national product has
apparently fallen about 25 per cent since the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century (Table 1)Notonly that, the multiplier which meas-
ures the response of final demand to a change in the gross national
product is, for a variety of reasons, smaller than it used to be; and this
decline cushions the impact of given changes in construction on the
rest of the economy and, indirectly, on construction itself.b0 The mone-
tary arrangements of the economy also are now less susceptible to
breakdown under the impact of declines in demand, a fact which works
in the same direction. The net result of these and other developments,
which act to make our economy somewhat more shock-resistant, is that
declines in construction activity, and associated declines in real estate
values, promise to act on the economy with diminished force, to feed
back more weakly on construction itself, and so to permit the separate
sectors of construction a greater opportunity to go their own ways in-
stead of joining to form a general wave in aggregate construction.
All this, however, is not to say that long swings in construction are
due to disappear. Business cycles, somewhat different in their mechan-
isms and in their severity, have survived many apparently fundamental
changes in the structure of the economy. And the same may prove true
of construction waves. The years after World War II saw a huge surge
of construction activity in which every branch of construction took
part. This great diffused boom was based in part on mechanisms which
also operated in the past. The big additions to the housing stock and
its spread to new locations were only part of the response to a joint
demand for structures, including commercial establishments, public
utilities, and government-provided facilities. The incomes so distributed
helped to generate the demand and the business profits which stimu-
lated industrial and other kinds of business construction. Altogether,
9The drop is less pronounced if the future importance of construction is taken
to be indicated by its share since World War II, but these have been years of boom
in construction activity. On the other hand, the share during the quarter-century
following 1929 is perhaps too low because it reflects the Great Depression and the
war.
lOCf. Burns, "Progress Towards Economic Stability" (6), pp. 149.
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these activities, directly and through the income streams they fed, made
for a tight labor market. Since immigration was restricted, the incomes
of young native-born adults were especially favored, and this helped to
drive rates of household formation and of births to unprecedented
levels.
Underlying all these developments, however, were surely the back-
logs of unsatisfied demands and of postponed plans, some stemming
from the restrictions of war, others reaching back to the depression of
the thirties. Supported by these demands and by generally easy finan-
cial markets, construction activity rocketed to very high levels from
which growth continued during the first half of the 1950's at a more
modest pace. Retardation from the very high rates of advance of the
late 1940's and early 1950's was, of course, inevitable. In fact, however,
the volume of construction became sufficiently large to make substantial
inroads on the backlogs which supported the demand. Residential
building far outran the rate of household formation which our demo-
grap)iic structure can normally support. The stock of industrial capital
grew faster than output. In these circumstances, the pace of growth in
construction became very iow.11 The advance of total new construction
liThe following figures show the geometric rates of growth per year (per cent)
of expenditures for new construction in 1954 dollars during successive intervals
since 1946. Except for 1946 and 1962, the terminal years of these intervals repre-
sent peaks in total private new construction.
Private Construction Public Construction
Total
Residential State and New
Nonf armOtherTotalFederal LocalTotal Construction
Intervals (1) (2) (8) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1946-48 25.0 5.8 14.6 0 39.7 25.4 16.4
1948-50 16.7 8.1 9.9 16.5 22.0 20.6 12.0
1950-55 3.3 5.7 4.8 8.1 7.8 7.9 5.2
1955-63 1.9 .8 1.4 2.5 3.5 3.2 1.9
Because these rates of growth are being compared with that of gross national
product, the underlying series represent the construction component of GNP and
differ somewhat in concept and scope from the Commerce-Labor series. The data
for cols. 1-3 and 7 for the years 1946-61 are from Economic Report of the President,
January 1964, Tables C-3 and C-5 (the latter extended back through 1946 by U.S.
Income and Output, Table 1-7). The 1963 data for the above columns are from
Survey of Current Business, July 1964, Tables 5 and 65. Total new public construc-
tion is estimated as the difference between total new construction and total private
construction. The division of total public construction into federal and state and
local is based on the distribution of current price series shown in Table C-37, ibid.
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between 1955 and 1963 was at the rate of only 1.9 per cent per annum;
for private construction alone the growth rate was only 1.4 per cent.
Consonant with the retardation in the expansion of construction
activity, the rates of growth of private consumption expenditures and,
of course, of GNP itself fell to levels which did not fully absorb our
growing labor force and stock of capital. It is as yet difficult to know
whether unemployment has been feeding back on construction by
impeding the rate of household formation. But the decline in the rate
of utilization of capital stock has undoubtedly played a part in limiting
the rate of advance of corporate profits even in current prices and
before taxes—to 1.5 per cent per annum between 1955 and 1959 and
to 1.7 per cent per annum from 1955 to 1963. After taxes and in terms
of the price levels of GNP and of construction, there have been actual
declines in corporate profits, both absolutely and still more in rela-
tion to the growing stock of capital; and this must in part account for
the protracted period of slow growth in capital formation and construc-
tion experienced in recent years.
As already stated, the alternation between the relatively high
growth rates of the immediate postwar period and the lower growth
rates during the latter half of the 1950's is not chiefly the outcome of the
peculiarities of the construction industry and its associated markets.
The long waves observed in construction in the past were only one
manifestation, though an important one, of a more general alternation
between acceleration and retardation which has characterized United
States development. A striking feature of the present period of retarda-
Because the table shows rates of growth during intervals bounded by peaks
in total private new construction, it does not do full justice to the retardation of
construction growth between successive peaks in residential and "other" private





1946-48 25.0 1946-48 5.8
1948-50 16.7
1950-55 3.3 1948-57 4.4
1955-59 1.7
1959-63 2.1 1957-63 .2
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tion is that, in spiteofpersistent underutilization of equipment and man-
power, it has not so far led to the financial crises, shocks to confidence,
and severe depressions of production, employment, and income which
marked such events in the past. If these more serious concomitants of
retardation can be avoided, there is some prospect that our growth will
be less clearly shaped by those diffused accumulations of postponed
business plans and deferred personal aspirations which produce a burst
of activity in all sectors at once and then give way to generalized retar-
dation. In that event, the special influences which act to differentiate
the paths of the various branches of construction may produce a good
deal of variety of behavior and so permit the economy to achieve a
steadier rate of growth. However, it remains to be seen whether, all
things considered, our economy can long sustain a period of heavy in-
vestment and rapid growth without the support it has received in the
past from the episodic release of hopes and plans temporarily sup-
pressed by depression or war.
139